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THE CONTROL OF LABOR THROUGH UNION
DISCIPLINE
MILLER D. STEEVER*
In an age of rapid change new arrangements and combinations
in society are in process of transferring the situs of authority and of
materially modifying that degree of emphasis which so frequently
determines its reality. While much is said about the official agency
of the community called the government, one finds innumerable
unofficial agencies of a political and economic character which,
operating within the margin of permissible conduct laid down by
the government, determine in practice the scope of individual action.
A type situation of such form of control results when in a given
industry most of the available labor supply is organized in a trade
union, and most of the available jobs are controlled by an incor-
porated employer or association of incorporated employers. If the
union and the employer have entered into a closed union shop agree-
ment, and if the union determines who shall be admitted into it,
then to the extent that trade union membership is the dominant
factor the rules and management of the union fix the opportunity to
work.
While growth of the "company union" and diminution in trade
union membership has in very recent years affected its relative
influence, the union contract in the situation described above is of
continuing importance. The workers themselves have sought to
subject it to some regulation. In this respect the successful move-
ment among a few unions such as the Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers to subject to the decisions of a trade board the power of the union
as well as of the employer to dispossess a worker of his job is of great
promise. The spread of this movement into other industries is,
however, retarded by the absence in those industries of the elements
requisite to its success, and the control of labor through union dis-
cipline remains a topic worthy of critical examination.
Primarily it is a question of the scope of organization among
employees. This is set forth in The Growth of American Trade Unions,
i88o-1923, by Leo Wolman. 1 In 1920 the total number of wage
earners, excluding those engaged in agriculture, was 23,480,077 of
which 4,881,200 or 20.8% were members of a trade union.2 In table
14 Wolman gives the following per cent. of wage earners organized
*Of the Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College.
'WoiN, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS, 1880-1923 (Bureau of
Economic Research 6, 1924), 2Ibd. 85, 86.
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in the major divisions of industry in 1920: extraction of minerals, 41;
manufacturing industries, 23.2; transportation, 37.3; building trades,
25.5; stationary engineers, 12.4; stationary firemen, 19.9. In Table
16, 3 the organization in 1920 of the divisions of the transportation
industry was: in all transportation, 37.3%; water transportation,
85.5%; steam railroads, 57.5%; with others tapering down to 8.3%.
In steam railroads the following change in membership occurred
between the years 192o and 1923 .4
Table I. For year 1923 1920
Locomotive engineers 87,400 96,goo
Locomotive firemen i18,ooo 125,900
Railroad trainmen 178,9oo 184,6oo
Railway conductors 6o,ooo 56,ooo
Switchmen 8,700 14,000
The scope of integration among employers as of June I, 1926
is made evident in Commercial and Industrial Organizations of the
United States,5 in the letter of submittal of which Dr. Julius Klein
states that computation shows "approximately 9ooo organizations,
made up of 1199 interstate, national and international, 1130 state,
and 6449 local organizations. Governmental, educational, profes-
sional, civic, agricultural, and religious organizations have been
omitted, the present directory containing strictly commercial and
industrial organizations." Among the organizations listed in this
directory we find the following with their membership stated:
Associated General Contractors of America, I7oo; National Associa-
tion of Builders Exchanges, 65oo; National Electric Light Associa-
tion, 14,462; National Coal Association, 9oo; American Foundry-
men's Association, x6oo; National Association of Sheet Metal
Contractors, 2500; Chamber of Commerce of the U. S., 779,262;
National Association of Master Plumbers, io,5oo; United Typothetae
of America, 2648; Associated Building Contractors of Illinois, 2ooo;
New York State Association of Builders, 18oo; Building Trades
Employers Association of the City of New York, 8oo. To this evi-
dence the National Industrial Conference Board adds "It is fairly
safe to assume the existence of between 8oo and iooo trade associa-
tions of national or interstate character at the present time."6
No figures have been discovered indicating the number of employees
who, as union men, are working under closed union shop agreements.
But the assumption that the number is large and that the condition
3 Thid. go. 4 bid. App. II6.
5DOMESTIC ComMERcE SERIES, No. 5 (Dept. of Commerce of U. S., 1926).
6NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BoARD, TRADE AssocIATIONs (1925)
App. A, 326.
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affects important industries is supported by the cases which have
appeared in the law reports where each one most probably represents
many others that have not been instituted or appealed to a court of
record. The considerable powers of discipline exercised by economic
groups upon their members is, of course, a general characteristic of
the high degree of integration in modem society. This form of coer-
* cion enables America to carry on its tremendous activity without a
corresponding increase of official governmental direction. The sanc-
tion of self government is so effective in the field of labor that some
of the older trade unions are assuming responsibility for the conduct
and productive effort of their members. This development of the
rules of self government and their adoption into the formal law of the
state is consequently of increasing importance.
A chief test of self government efficacy is the power of an unin-
corporated voluntary labor union to suspend or expel its members.
The case of Abdon v. Wallace7 reopens the discussion of this particular
topic. This and seven other cases, identical in all material partic-
ulars, were tried together by the lower court without a jury, and
a single finding of facts and conclusions of law filed. The plaintiffs,
originally members of the former local 492 of the Grand Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, sought injunctive
relief to compel the defendants, who are the officers, and members
of said local, to recognize the plaintiffs as members of the Brother-
hood and entitled to the rights incidental to membership. From
judgment for defendants the plaintiffs appealed and the judgment
was reversed with instructions. The Brotherhood, an unincorporated
association of locomotive engineers comprised all but a small portion
of such employees in the United States and Canada. Until February
27, 1916, the only "local" of the Brotherhood on the Chicago Division
of the Big Four was 492 of which plaintiffs and the same defendants
were members. The Brotherhood was so organized that in each
local a committee of three members was charged with the duty of
* adjusting with the local officials of the particular railroad involved
all grievances of its members. The chairmen of all local committees
comprised a general committee which the union charged with the
duty of adjusting with the management of the railroad involved,
controversies not requiring for settlement the participation of the
president of the railroad. By its rules and upon written application
to the local chairman "every member of the Brotherhood had the
right to have any grievance settled or interest of his own protected
by the local committee or general committee of adjustment." More-
7x65 N. E. 68 (Ind. App. 1929).
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over, each local was represented by one delegate and an alternate
to the Grand International Division of the Brotherhood called the
G.I.D. These delegates, with the Grand Chief Engineer and the
other officers of the G.I.D. constituted the "supreme governing body
of the Brotherhood", which operated under a written constitution,
and standing rules.
These rules provided the only process for punishing a member,
namely, the preferring of written charges against him before his
local; the bringing of the charges to the notice of its next regular
meeting; the reference of such charges to an investigating committee
of three members; the report by such committee to the local and, if
evidence against the accused be found, the delivery of a copy of the
charges by the committee chairman to the accused with notice to
him of the time of his trial; the hearing of evidence; the ballot by
the members present on the question of guilt and, upon conviction, a
ballot on the penalty.
Among the offenses for which a member might be disciplined a
rule of the Brotherhood provided, "Sect. 12. Any member or division,
who, by verbal or written memorandum to any one, calculated to
injure or interfere with national legislative matters offered by our
legislative representative members at Washington... or at any time
makes suggestion to any one that may be detrimental to the interest
of such legislation, shall be expelled when proven guilty as per
section 49 of the Statutes."
On September 28, 1915, plaintiff Rother, in active service as a
locomotive engineer on the Big Four, was engaged in the occupation
of a headlight inspector. Pursuant to his duty to obey the orders
of the general superintendent of the railroad he reported on that
date to a designated person in Washington, D. C. and was thereupon
served with a subpoena commanding his appearance at a hearing
before the Interstate Commerce Commission concerning the adop-
tion, by the railroads of the United States, of a particular type of
electric headlight which was favored by the Brotherhood and by its
chief executive, Warren S. Stone. At the hearing, Rother, being
sworn, made no voluntary statements but answered questions put to
him. He testified certain disadvantages which he had observed in
the use of this type of headlight. Stone learning of this testimony
was displeased. He claimed that Rother had violated Section 12
of the rules of the Brotherhood and directed the chief of Local 492
to prefer charges against him. He was tried before the local and upon
a ballot of the members found not guilty. Stone thereupon with the
aid of the officers of Local 492 suspended its charter and organized a
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New Local Number 546 including all former members of 492 except-
ing Rother and sixteen, of his friends, among them the plaintiffs.
No charges were preferred against the sixteen and this action by
Stone and other officers was without authority under the rules of
the Brotherhood. Since the formation of Local 546, all the plaintiffs
have been excluded from all activities and benefits of the Brother-
hood.
On their petition for reinstatement the court, as already stated
held for the plaintiffs. As to Warren S. Stone the court said "his
conduct was reprehensible in the extreme, and we marvel that an
association of the high standing of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers retains in such a responsible position one whose ideals,
if we may judge from his acts herein, are so out of keeping with the
principles of common honesty"; and later "who is this man Stone,
that he should presume to instruct a witness as to what his testimony
should be before a government commission and to penalize him for
testifying to the truth?-Appellees [defendants] and Stone con-
spired with each other ... to drive appellants [plaintiffs] out of the
brotherhood... in violation of the laws of the brotherhood...
*A suspension of the charter of local division 492, together with a
refusal to transfer... appellants ... to local division 546, was
equivalent to the suspension of such members."9 -This suspension
not occurring in accordance with the rules of the Brotherhood estab-
lishing the process for trial, it was void.
The opinion reiterates the rule that where property interests
are involved injunctive relief will be granted to restore to member-
ship those suspended by a process other than that provided by the
union regulations. Plaintiffs by the suspension were deprived of: (i)
the preferment in securing and retaining work which union men had;
(2) participation in union insurance; and (3) the advantage of having
grievances with an employer handled by an influential organization
repregenting their interests. 10 The court's comment upon Stone,
9Supra note 7, at 74, 75.
1OAccord: Thompson v. Grand Int. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 41
Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S. W. 834 (1905) in which damages were allowed for ex-
pulsion because of testifying upon oath as a witness in court. Enrollment in the
union was given as 6o,ooo members; St. Louis-So. West. R. R. v. Thompson, 102
Tex. 89, 1138. W. 114 (19o8), i9 ANN. CAS. 1250 (1911). Burke v. Monumental
Division No. 52 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 273 Fed. 707 (D. Md.
i959). See Love v. Grand International etc., of Locomotive Engineers, .39 Ark
375; 215 S. W. 602 (5959), where the charges did not include testifying in court
but in circulating information against the interests of the brotherhood and con-
trary to the constitution. Expulsion after properly conducted trial in organi-
zation upheld by court.
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while it does not add to the legal content of the decision, does cal
attention to a specific instance of the ldnd of high handed action
an opportunity for which the structure of American unionism affords
its executives. In comparison with the British, the American trade
union executive is relatively unrestricted in his action between
conventions."
The legal principles involved in this type situation are relatively
simple. The right of a labor union to determine who shall be admit-
ted to membership is complete and without qualification. In the
leading case of Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Association'2 the
complainants were a voluntary unincorporated association of master
stone cutters and two journeymen stone cutters. Defendants,
officers and members of a voluntary unincorporated association of
journeymen stonecutters, had refused to admit these two journeymen
because of a rule of the union against admitting any new members
for one year. For lack of membership the two men were unable to
secure work, as the master stone cutters, though desiring more work-
men, would not employ non-union men. The union itself had no
"contract" to that effect with them, however. The court of chancery
refused to issue a decree to compel admission into a voluntary asso-
ciation, saying, "These organizations are formed for the purpose
mutually agreed upon; their right to make by-laws and rules for the
admission of members and the transaction of business is unques-
tionable. They may require such qualifications for membership,
and such formalities of election, as they choose ... may restrict
membership to the original promoters, or limit the number to be
thereafter admitted. The very idea of such organizations is associa-
tion mutually acceptable... A power to require the admission of a
person in any way objectionable to the society is repugnant to the
scheme of its organization."' 3
In accord is Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, 4 where the
defendant Council refused to admit plaintiff, Local No. 162 of -the
"An illustration of the consequences of expulsion is indicated in Sweetman v.
Barrows, 263 Mass. 349, r6i N. E. 272 (1928) where a voluntary association of
moving picture operators controlled employment in 85% of the moving picture
theatres and exchanges in Boston and within a radius of io miles, the jobs being
allocated by the business agent of the local. Because of expulsion from the union
plaintiff was unable to secure employment from Oct. 1923 to Feb. 1925.
n47 N. J. Eq. 519, 2o Atl. 492 (i89o). Accord: Muller v. Bricklayers' Masons'
Plasterers' International Union, i4o Atl. 424 (N. J. 1928), where an apprentice
had failed to register and file his apprenticeship agreement in time.
13Mayer r. Journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n, supra note 12, at 524,2o Atl. at 491.
"7! Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac. 824 (1925).
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Sheet Metal Workers, demanded a tax or fine of $4.50 per member
of said local, and threatened to call out on strike members of other
crafts engaged in the building industry in shops in which members
of said local worked. The court reversed the temporary restraining
order saying it would not interfere to compel admission into a
voluntary association even though damage otherwise results.
Once a man is admitted to membership, however, the courts will
prevent or give damages for his improper expulsion. The general
rule is stated in Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive En-
gineers v. Green," in which plaintiff, Green, brought an action for
damages for wrongful and malicious expulsion, receiving a verdict
of $17,500. On appeal the court held for the plaintiff, saying that
he need not even show that he had exhausted all remedies within
the association because reversal of its decision by the union would
not afford full redress for injury to property rights. "The expulsion
of a member, if for cause within the jurisdiction of the tribunal of
the association by which it is pronounced, after notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard and a trial conducted in accordance with the
constitution, laws, and' regulations of the association, is conclusive
upon the civil courts; but the courts hold that such associations
must act in good faith and must not violate the laws of the land or
any inalienable right of their members."' 6 The trial of Green by the
union preliminary to his expulsion was declared not bona fide, be-
cause the charges (which are not given in the report of the case)
were other than the ones upon which he was expelled. His expulsion
was induced by resentment of the fact that, when a strike of the rail-
way brotherhoods was being discussed just prior to the declaration
of war between the United States and Germany the plaintiff declared
that his first allegiance was to his country. This, the court held, was
not a sufficient ground for his expulsion. It conceded that the com-
plaint stated a case for punitive damages, but the verdict of $17,500
was deemed excessive and reduced by the court to $12,500.
In the trial of its members the union must meticulously follow the
procedure which it has adopted, otherwise the decision is void.'7 In
the leading case of Brennan v. United Hatters,8 which involved the
fining by a union of a member, Brennan was found guilty by the
union committee of charges which were developed at a hearing at
which he was present solely in the capacity of a witness. It was held
15210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923).
1Ijd- 499, 98 So. at 572.
"Abdon v. Wallace, supra note 7.
'873 N. J. L. 729, 65 N. E. z65 (19o6).
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that he had not been properly notified of the charges, and that the
fine was void.
In Froelich v. Musicians Mutual Benefit Association9 the plaintiff
was a member of an unincorporated association composed exclusively
of musicians, which had elaborate by-laws with a schedule of prices
and regulations governing the conduct of its members. During a
strike on a local transit company the association, in violation of its
by-laws, passed a resolution fining all members who rode on the street
cars of this company. Froelich did so ride, was fined, refused to pay
and was being expelled for such refusal when he procured a restrain-
ing order which was made perpetual. It was held that the resolution
imposing the fine was illegally adopted.
In Connell v. Stalker" plaintiff was treasurer and defendant was
president of the Journeymen Stonecutters' Association of New York.
When the plaintiff refused to give up his treasurer's books to a com-
mittee appointed to investigate a certain account, the members
voted to suspend him and that no member work with him. As a
result he was discharged from his work and was idle nine weeks.
The constitution and by-laws provided that the treasurer must turn
over the books to the trustees every four months for audit, also that a
member could not be suspended except for working in a scab shop,
or a violation in an aggravated manner of the constitution or by-laws.
The plaintiff, suing for the amount of wages he lost, received judg-
ment which was affirmed. The court said that the suspension was
not warranted by the constitution or by-laws, "which constitutes
his contract with the association."'" This case seems to go unreason-
ably far in protecting the interests of the member.
Two recent cases are Spiegel v. Locomotive Engineers Mutual Life
and Accident Association" and McCantz v. Brotherhood of Painters,
Decorators and Paperhangers of America.3 In the Spiegel case the
plaintiff, who was the widow of a former member of the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, membership in which was requisite to
holding insurance, sued for insurance as beneficiary. The defendant
claimed that deceased had been expelled from the Brotherhood under
Section 51 of its laws specifying expulsion for taking the place of a
1993 Mo. App. 383 (1902).
2021 Misc. 6o9, 48 N. Y. Supp. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1897).
21IbW. 611, 48 N. Y. Supp. at 79.
2166 Minn. 366, 207 N. W. 722 (1926).
213 S. W. (2d) 902 (Tex. 1929). See also International Union of Steam and
Operating Engineers v. Owens, xI9 Ohio St. 94, 162 N. E. 386 (1928), allowing a
mandatory injunction to issue to an unincorporated union to accord a member
access to all the procedural rights afforded under the union's rules.
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striker. The rules required written charges and that evidence be
produced at a member's trial. Deceased was present at his trial but
no written charges had been furnished him and no evidence was
there produced against him. He denied he had taken a striker's
place. The expulsion was held to be void because no written charges
were given him. "In such organization formal and technical proced-
ure cannot be expected, but when such vital matters are involved
the accused is entitled to a substantial compliance with the law."24
In the McCantz ease the plaintiff, a member, sued the Brotherhood,
a corporation, for damages sustained because of his suspension from
Local io69 and the consequent denial of the privilege to work as a
union man, the loss of disability and death benefits, and for exemplary
damages. The trial court directed judgment for defendant. On
appeal, this was affirmed as to the ruling on exemplary damages,
but reversed and the case remanded for new trial on the issue of
actual damages. In Houston, plaintiff's home, there were two locals,
Nos. 13o and io6g, also a District Council No. 15. Under the charter,
constitution and by-laws of 1o69, the defendant, it was improper
"for any member to work for an employer who might be designated
by them as unfair to union labor", and elaborate procedure was
provided for the trial of any member, with written charges, notice,
appointment of a trial committee, balloting upon its report, etc.
Section 294 stated "If the accused wilfully neglects or refuses to
stand trial, the committee shall find him guilty of contempt and he
shall be punished as the local union or district council may deter-
mine." The present plaintiff, while a member of Local 13o was
charged with working in an unfair shop. The trial committee recom-
mended he be exonerated provided he resign his job. He refused to
do so. The local accepted the report and discharged the committee
and plaintiff immediately left the meeting at which these proceedings
took place. At a later meeting of Local 13o at which he was not
present, he was fined $50 under Section 294 but was not so notified.
Later he was admitted to Local io69. Upon the complaint of Local
13o that he had not paid the fine the Vice-president of the Brother-
hood ordered Local xo69 to suspend him and this was done. The
court held that a suspended member may apply to the civil courts
for damages and need not resort to the tribunals set up by the
association. It decided that the $5o fine was void because imposed
without notice to appear for a new trial and after plaintiff had left
the meeting believing he had been acquitted and that no other
24Spiegel v. Locomotive Engineering Mutual Life and Accident Ass'n, supra
note 22, at 369, 207 N. W. at 723.
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charges were pending against him. Therefore, it concluded defendant
was not justified in instructing Local io69 to exclude him..
This case is an apt illustration of the difficulty experienced by
labor organizations in carrying out the process laid down in their
rules for the trial of members. Untrained in such procedural details
the executives need the constant counsel of a lawyer. The decision
of the Vice-president in the McCantz case was evidently a sound
practical solution; but courts tend to regard these organization
procedures in a technical light. The non-legal, informal modes of
trial used by trade boards in the adjustment of disputes arising
under trade agreements are a procedure better suited to the object
of securing justice through devices usable by men untrained in legal
technique but trained in that of the operations of the industry in-
volved. Complicated union rules of procedure administered by men.
untrained in procedure, combined with appeal to the civil courts
administered by men untrained in the technique of industrial opera-
tions appears to be as complete a divorce of function from capacity
as could well be devised.
In Hess v. Johnsonu in a suit for death benefits, the Court upheld
a provision of the constitution of the New York Plate Printers'
Union, an unincorporated society, which provided that one who had
been three months in arrears in dues during the six months im-
mediately preceding his death is not entitled to the death benefits.
The constitution being the contract between, the parties; even though
the provision was unreasonable, was held not illegal.
A union rule providing for a suspension without notice of the
charges, is, however, void. In Bricklayers, etc. Union v. Bowen8 an
action for equitable relief was brought by members.of Local 39 in
Rochester against the officers of the International Union because
the latter had suspended the local, without a hearing, and had
established another, Local 53, to which most of, the members of
Local 39 were transferred. The constitution of the International
provided for the immediate suspension of officers or locals. A provi-
sion for removal or suspension without notice is void as against
public policy, the court held. The law treats members of voluntary
associations as "one family, and entitled to settle their family jars
without outside interference, and in their own way," but "insures
to every member ... a fair trial,.not only in accordance with the
constitution and by-laws of the association, but also with the de-
mands of fair play, which in the final analysis is the spirit of the liw
24i App. Div. 465, 58 N. Y. Supp. 983 (2d Dept. 1899).
26183 N. Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
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of the land .... Labor organizations have become an integral part
of our business life, and wield a powerful influence upon the every day
affairs of multitudes of our people. In return for the benefits which,
when rightfully managed, they insure, their members surrender to
them all individual trade, freedom, and must rely upon their honest,
fair, and efficient management for opportunity to support themselves
and their families."27
In Gilmore v. Palmer8 the constitution of Local 2028 of the Boot
and Shoe Cutters' Protective Association provided, Section 30, "Any
member of the order advocating its disruption, of the withdrawal of
any local or other assembly, shall by that act stand expelled from the
order. This shall also apply to any local or other assembly that
permits the discussion of such a motion. The general executive
board shall enforce this provision upon proof satisfactory of said
offence by said board, subject to appeal to the general assembly."
This was held to be invalid because it provided for suspension
"summarily without notice, without trial, without preferment of
charges in writing, and without hearing,... and all proceedings
taken under it are void." 29 In Swaine v. Miller the by-laws, Section
21 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
provided "He (The General President) shall have power to suspend
any local union for any violation of the constitution or laws of the
United Brotherhood, by consent of a majority of the general execu-
tive board." This too was held to be unreasonable and void because
authorizing action without notice to the offending party. Here the
local had been suspended. because it refused to expel some of its
members. In People ex rel. Schults v. Love,31 however, the Court up-
held the provisions of the constitution of the International Union
of Steam and Operating Engineers giving locals power to suspend or
expel a member by three-fourths vote "when the evidence is plain
and the circumstances require immediate action." In this case
another provision set forth a process of making charges, service,
notice of hearing, hearing and a majority vote, with the right of
appeal to the union. The relator was summoned before a meeting,
admitted his offence, i.e., falsely accusing an officer of the union of
owing him money and of illegal action during a strike, and by a
majority vote was suspended for an indefinite period. A voluntary
27bid. 858-861.
21O9 Misc. 552, 179 N. Y. Supp. i (Sup. Ct. i99).
29Ibid. 553, 179 N. Y. Supp. at 2.
3072 Mo. App. 446 (1897).
31199 App. Div. 815, 192 N. Y. Supp. 354 (ist Dept. 1922).
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association, the court said, may provide for suspension or expulsion of
a member by summary action and without formal trial. Compare
this with Gilmore v. Palmer, supra. In the Schults case the member
admitted his offence so that "the evidence is plain" but the "cir-
cumstances" hardly "require immediate action."
When the charter of the association contains no power of expul-
sion it can be exercised only when a member has committed some
infamous offence or act tending to the destruction of the society.
In Weiss v. Musical Mutual Protective Union,"2 circulating a petition
urging attendance at a meeting to consider combining with organized
labor was held not to be such an offence.
Before resorting to the civil courts the plaintiff in these cases is
held to certain respect for the union process. Where injunctive
relief is sought to prevent suspension or a mandamus to compel
readmission, the complainant must first exhaust all remedies with
the organization, provided they are reasonable and available. In
Hall v. Morrinn the plaintiff, who was a member of Local x8 of the
International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Iron Workers asked for an injunction against the officers of the
union. The latter's constitution provided a complete system of
government with quasi-judicial process. When the plaintiff, Hall,
was elected president of Local i8, Morrin, who was president of the
International body, threatened to suspend the local because Hall
had not been a member in good standing for the previous year as
required by the by-laws. Hall then sued the present defendant and
Local i8, charging them with unjustifiable action. That suit was
dismissed by the court. Under an article of the constitution provid-
ing that "charges may be filed against any... member... on the
ground of improper conduct... wilfully slandering any officer...
committing any offence discreditable to the International Associa-
tion etc." one of defendants in the suit then preferred charges
against Hall that he had brought suit in the civil courts instead of
pursuing his remedy through the organization. He was tried fairly
according to the procedure of the organization, found guilty, and
fined. It was in relation to this fine that Hall brought this present
action which resulted in a decree for defendants. The court held:
"Plaintiff should be required to pursue the remedies available to
him within the order... the court slould not interfere by injunc-
tion, either to abrogate the contractual rights and obligations of the
3i89 Pa. 446, 42 AtI. 118 (1899).
3293 S. W. 435 (Mo. 1927).
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members... or to substitute its own form of discipline for that which
all the members of such organization for their own mutual benefit
have contracted to subject themselves."' '
Where, however, the right of appeal within the union is so hedged
about by conditions as to amount to a denial of justice a plaintiff
need not exhaust his remedy within the union before bringing ac-
tion.3 This appears from Mullen v. Seegers36 where plaintiff, a mem-
ber of Local 238 of the United Garment Workers of America, brought
an action for damages against the defendants, officers of the national
and of the local. While employed in the shop of X company in the
spring of i9x8 these defendants, without following the procedure
of the union, announced that a strike had been called at another
shop of the X company and told the plaintiff to quit work. She re-
fused, giving as her reason that she did not feel it her duty to strike
when she was doing government work. A few days later she was
fined$25 andher dues were refused until the fine was paid. Because of
this difficulty she was refused employment at other plants until
she settled her dispute with the union. She brought suit without
attempting to appear before the higher union authorities. Without
discussing the issues the court held the case came within the excep-
tion that one unlawfully suspended from a union may sue for damages
without first exhausting her remedies within the organization.
Expulsion because of misrepresentation inducing admission to the
union is supported by the courts. In Kraus v. Sander7 plaintiff
brought an action in equity against defendant, a voluntary unincor-
porated association, for reinstatement in the Brewer's Union, from
which he had beem expelled because he secured admission with a
forged certificate and under false representations. Under the con-
stitution expulsion was by vote of two-thirds majority. At a meeting
of 250 members, plaintiff being present, 128 voted for expulsion and
none against him. In giving judgment for the defendant the court
stated: "It is a gross violation of good faith to the organization and
its members for an applicant to gain admission by forged certifi-
cates and false representations as to his history, condition or charac-
2 4
.bid. 441. Accord: Crisler v. Crum, 213 N. W. 366 (Neb. 1927) which also
contains an excellent description of the working of seniority rules under a closed
union shop agreement.
3Corregan v. Hay, 94 App. Div. 71, 87 N. Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dept. 19o4)
where payment of $5o fine was required before receiving copy of charges and
appeal required trip from Syracuse, N. Y. to Indianapolis, Ind.
36294 S. W. 745 (Mo. 1927).
3766 Misc. 6ol, 122 N. Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
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ter."' It held that the proviso of the constitution meant two-thirds
of those voting.
In Beesley v. Chicago journeymen Plumbers etc. Association;9 the
court upheld an expulsion due to lack of requisite skill. Beesley
had been admitted to membership on his representing himself to be a
journeyman plumber and an efficient workman. Later some of the
members charged that he was not a plumber but a bricklayer. On
being notified to appear at a later meeting he stated "that he was
not thoroughly practical in all the work of journeymen plumbers,
but believed he knew the theory." A committee appointed to test
his qualifications called upon him to "submit to a test in lead-work
known as 'wiping a joint'." He refused to take this test, and on his
admitting that he was a bricklayer by trade "and could not justify
as an all-around plumber" he was expelled. The court refused to
mandamus.
SUMMARY
The decision of the court in upholding or rejecting the expulsion is
thus shown to be based sometimes upon the nature of the cause of
expulsion and sometimes upon the nature of the process used by
the union. The types of control and the reasons asserted for its
exercise by the union upon its membership remain to be summed up.
This factual study shows the causes of expulsion as follows. The
number refers to citation of case in the footnotes.
In discussing proposed strike of locomotive engineers on eve of war
with Germany plaintiff declares his first allegiance to his country, (1S)
Refusal to strike when working on war contracts. (36)
Bringing legal proceedings to prevent strike. (io, Burke v. Loco.
Eng.)
Giving testimony in civil cause. (io, Thompson v. Loco. Eng.)
Giving testimony before government commission. (7)
Testifying in civil cause. (io, St. Louis etc. R. R. v. Thompson)
Issuing circulars attacking unionpolicy. (io, Love v. Loco. Eng.)
Non-payment of dues. (ii)
Non-payment of fine. (i8 & i9)
Treasurer's refusal to open books for audit. (20)
Taling place of striker. (22)
Working in non-union shop. (23, McCantz v. .Bro.)
Funds solicited from business men "expended in riotous living,"
and refusal of local to suspend said members. (3o)
Knowingly bringing false charges against union official. (3i)
"mIW. 6o3, 122 N. Y. Supp. at 56.
3944 Il. App. 278 (1892).
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Circulating petition urging association with rival union. (32)
In public speech stating that the union was "rotten to the core"
and the president was the "worse dog among them." (35)
Using forged certificate and false representations to gain admission
to union. (37)
Misrepresentation of skill to gain admission to union. (39)
Initiating legal process against members of own union for violation
of the Sunday closing laws.40
In capacity as a member of a city plumbing board refusing to
appoint as plumbing inspector an individual selected'by union;4
-an interesting case involving local politics and attempt of eco-
nomic groups to dictate appointments.
4"Manning v. Klein, x Pa. Super. Ct. 210 (I896).
Schneider v. Local Union No. 6o, II6 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905), 5 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 89I (1907), 7 ANN. CAS. 868 (1907).
